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ABSTRACT: This article critiques the Australian Government’s White 
Paper: Australia in the Asian Century. It begins by reflecting on the relationship 
between Australia and Asia suggesting that this is measured solely through the 
narrow economic lens of Australian interests. The critique then focusses on the 
key drivers presented as the means by which Australia will navigate the Asian 
century concluding that although Australia punches above its weight in terms of 
living standards, equity and social inclusion, the White Paper overstates the 
country’s capability and capacity particularly in the areas of skills, education, 
innovation and relationship development. This presents a number of unrealistic 
expectations, presenting difficulties for the current government to fund the 
fundamental initiatives required to deliver on the promises contained in the 
document.    
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1. INTRODUCTION  
   The White Paper; Australia in the Asian Century (2012), delivered by 
former Australian Treasury figure Ken Henry, was the first fully 
elaborated political and strategically focused government document to 
present the direction and self-perception of Australia’s position in relation 
to the nation’s interests in the Asian region. It was also the most 
comprehensive document of its kind since the 1989 “Australia and the 
Northeast Asian ascendancy” Garnaut paper, which focused on trade 
outcomes with the then emerging East Asian giants.    
   Though Prime Minister Julia Gillard initially claimed that she lacked 
interest in Foreign Affairs, the document she commissioned addressed a 
combination of Australian economic assumptions relative to Asian 
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economies and provides insights into Australia’s perceived role within 
this context. The White Paper, which took one year to complete and 
involved over 150 separate consultations, was released in the midst of 
global uncertainty, especially with regard to the performance of Asian 
economies. It was also a paper that sought to address the oft-used 
explanation of China’s role in helping Australia bypass the worst of the 
global financial crisis since 2008.   
   Coincidentally, the White Paper was released in the historic week in 
which both the Chinese and US leadership was being decided. The 
release of this White Paper also commemorated forty years of diplomatic 
relations with China. This could be interpreted as recognition that 
Australia’s strategic direction remained firmly tied to markets that are on 
the one hand, the centre of global growth and on the other, reliant on 
Australia’s mineral commodities.   
   Certainly, Australia has come a long way since the pre-1945 days when 
its destiny was dependent on the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Commonwealth. At that time, not only were more than half of Australia’s 
exports bound for the UK (DFAT, 2002) but Australia’s political, 
strategic and security direction was also firmly based on this historical 
and ongoing relationship. This Anglocentric mindset ultimately 
underpinned Australia’s entry into the First (Great) and Second World 
Wars, which remain to this day icons of Australia’s national identity. But 
Britain’s place in the world would change dramatically after World War 
Two and the world would be dominated by the emerging United States 
and its Cold War tussle with the former Soviet Union. This vulnerability 
forced Australia to rethink security arrangements within its region and the 
decisions made at that time have continued to inform security policy as 
Australia juggles its international commitments with its aspirations for 
regional prosperity (Bull, 1977; Miller, 1966).  
   While Europe was the theatre of the Cold War in the west, in the Far 
East soon after the end of the Second World War, China was the theatre 
of a social uprising with the People’s Liberation Army under the 
leadership of Mao Tse Tung, creating a new China and setting the stage 
for an Asian Cold War. From the early 1950s, much of Australia’s 
attention, with its limited military capabilities, was focused on this new 
entity’s emergence on the world stage and especially on the ideological 
position it represented for regional security. China epitomized a 
Communist threat to the region and ultimately to “capitalist” countries in 
the area. Australia was positioned as a beacon of the west and a partner of 
the new US superpower’s presence in Asia. The political approach at that 
time was, therefore, to reject China’s rise and rally against this emerging 
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power. Indeed, Australia along with numerous western nations, refused to 
even acknowledge the presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
until the Labor government formally recognised it in 1972 (Bull, 1977; 
Fullilove and Oliver, 2013). It is worth noting, however, that although 
Australia did not formally recognise Communist China before 1972, 
Australia did have a strong export relationship with the so-called 
“Mainland” China, especially in the area of wheat exports. As a result, 
the economic relationship with China is long standing and has not always 
been influenced by American policy in the region.  
   The aim of this paper is to provide a critique of the Government’s 
White Paper in a focused analysis of its immediate past and current 
context and to discuss and challenge some of the key drivers that 
underpin it. We seek to go beyond the somewhat superficial 
commentaries previously published on this document to assess the spirit, 
tone and veracity of the paper by comparing some of the key future 
assessments contained within the paper with available evidence. Through 
this process we gauge the likelihood of success of some of the initiatives 
foreshadowed in the document and provide a series of conclusions that 
we anticipate will open up further debate on Australia’s position in the 
Asian Century.   
 
2. THE STRUCTURE OF THE WHITE PAPER  
   Published in October 2012, the White Paper is a comprehensive 
document set out in nine Chapters. Chapter One catalogues the rise of 
Asia and is, for the most part, an innocuous historical overview. Chapter 
Two discusses Asia's future to 2025, predicting strong economic growth 
ahead while highlighting historical rises in gross domestic product (GDP) 
across the region. It presents forecasts and projections for the region, 
predicting that average economic growth rates will exceed six percent in 
many Asian countries particularly China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Malaysia with Thailand lagging a little at about five percent. The White 
Paper concedes that productivity is a driver of economic growth and 
reminds us that productivity increases in the Australian economy have 
declined over the past decade. Chapter two also examines the history of 
Australia's engagement within the Asian region going back to the end of 
the cold war hostilities with the former Soviet Union. It compliments 
Australia for policy change in the development of macroeconomic 
frameworks, asserting that the rise of Asia will provide great 
opportunities for Australia. A series of charts and graphs, as well as case 
studies of Australian manufacturing, are presented to support this 
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contention. Despite these pictorial additions, however, the resources 
sector maintains a position of prime importance, followed by education, 
which is presented as the largest of Australia's services exports. This 
claim is based on the number of Asian students studying in Australia, 
particularly those from the Association of East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
countries, China and India.   
   Chapter three discusses Australia in Asia, focusing on developing 
institutional connections and what is termed Australia’s economic 
integration into Asia as well as regional engagement. Chapter four 
discusses Australia’s comparative advantages and the opportunities 
arising from Asia’s development. Collectively, these four chapters are 
presented as “setting the context for the Asian Century” (p. 4), while the 
five chapters that follow (Chapters 5 – 9) present a “roadmap to navigate 
the Asian century” (p. 5).   
   Our analysis begins by reflecting on the relationship between Australia 
and Asia (Chapters 1 – 4), suggesting that this is contradictory and 
measured solely through the narrow economic lens of Australian 
interests. Moreover, we contend that it lacks the essential elements of 
trust and commitment that bond ongoing relationships (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). The key intention of this component of our analysis is to examine 
the projected direction established for Australia within the White Paper 
and to determine whether it is an affirmation of blind faith in the 
continued demand for mineral resources or a considered purposeful 
direction based on an accurate assessment of the national competencies 
and capabilities required to underpin a more mature Australia that can 
lead and engage with all of our neighbours in a respectful way regardless 
of whether they are major resource consumers.   
   Following our reflection on the background and context that underpins 
the document (Chapters 1-4), we focus on the key drivers contained 
within the roadmap that has been presented as the means by which 
Australia will navigate the Asian century. The roadmap is underpinned by 
Chapters five to nine and the key dimensions of each of these chapters are 
presented in Table 1 below. In our analysis we reflect on a number of 
these dimensions and present our synopsis of how these are likely to play 
out in the Australian/Asian context. Our conclusions are then presented in 
the context of the White Paper statement that declares that: “Australia 
will be a more prosperous and resilient nation, fully part of the region and 
open to the world” (p. 5).  
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Table 1. Roadmap to Navigate the Asian Century. 
 
Chapter 5  Chapter 6  Chapter 7  Chapter 8  Chapter 9  
• skills and 
education  
  
• innovation  
  
• infrastructure  
  
• tax reform  
  
• regulatory 
reform  
  
• environmental 
sustainability  
  
• macroeconomic 
and financial 
frameworks  
 
• schools  
  
• universities  
  
• vocational training  
  
• participation  
  
• Asia-capable 
leaders and 
institutions  
  
• adaptability  
  
• fair, multicultural 
and cohesive 
society  
• tapping into 
regional 
opportunities 
  
• linking with 
value chains 
 
• starting at  
home  
  
• working in 
the region  
 
• security has 
underpinned 
Asia’s 
development  
  
• changing 
security 
environment  
  
• building trust  
  
• comprehensive 
national,  
collective and 
human  
security  
• effective 
diplomacy  
  
• stronger and 
more 
comprehensive 
relationships  
  
• closer people-
to people links  
  
• vibrant cultural 
connections  
  
Source: Adapted from Australia in the Asian Century White Paper. 
 
3. THE MINERALS DISCOVERY – AUSTRALIAN LUCK AND 
OBSESSION   
   Until the 1960s Australia’s primary industry was concentrated around 
agricultural products and wool. With the war rationing system still in 
place until the early 1950s, there was a need for food to feed a population 
that was increasing at a rapid rate. Indeed, the birth rate in Australia in 
the 1950s doubled from that of the 1930s (Butlin et al., 1982) and this 
natural population increase was further boosted by migration programs 
designed to assist with post war reconstruction. As a result, “…from 1947 
to 1971 the annual rate of [population] growth was 2.2 percent, though it 
slowed from 1972 to 1979 to 1.3 percent … and 1.5 percent in 1982 … 
(Betts, 1984, p.48). 
   At the same time, Australia was a small, late developer in 
manufacturing and its services industry was internally focused, 
concentrating mainly on short terms needs. As a result, agriculture and 
wool in their own respective ways offered important economic 
opportunities for Australia’s international trade profile. The Korean War, 
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for example, drove the demand for wool and, as a result, the price of wool 
reached historic highs. Australia also consolidated its markets for 
agricultural products within the UK and beyond. The mineral wealth that 
now dominates Australia’s economy remained hidden beneath the soil 
until the 1960s (Mascitelli and Tinney, 2012).   
   Even during the period of the Whitlam government (1972-75), and 
especially after its fall in 1975, Australia displayed a split personality in a 
real politic game in which relations with China were encouraged because 
they supported Australian economic interests but were always tempered 
by security concerns. This is reflected in its approach to Taiwan, human 
rights, and a hard line stance that mirrors the US hard power approach 
(Wang, 2012). This contradictory approach is still inherent in Australia’s 
White Paper aspirations which are based on an expectation that China 
will continue its agenda of state de-regulation, privatisation, and the 
dismantling of “socialist foundations”. Within the White Paper, the 
opening up of the Chinese economy appears to be linked to political 
democratisation, indicating that the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 
and the annihilation of the democratisation movement will not reoccur. In 
reality, it would seem that the enriched middle class, which is the driver 
of emerging wealth, and the upper class in China, are content that the 
current political leadership still best represents its interests. Can it be 
assumed that this state of affairs will necessarily last? As long as China’s 
interests are in line with the nationalist will of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), this is likely to continue. But growing levels of corruption 
and the personal enrichment of members of the political elite may reach 
breaking point. The arrest of Bo Xia Lai, for instance, may be the “tip of 
the iceberg” and, if so, other cases could provoke an internal reaction and 
party conflict. How the bureaucracy reacts to retain political and 
economic power within the party under such circumstances remains to be 
seen, but it would be unwise to assume it would not be forceful and 
repressive. Certainly, the personal wealth accumulated by the families of 
previous and current party leaders appears to be eroding credibility for a 
party that preaches equality and care for the people (Barboza and 
LaFraniere, 2012; He, 2012).   
 
4. EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY OR DIPLOMATIC BARN DANCE? 
THE OUTLOOK FOR TRADE WITH ASIA 
   Although Australian trade, especially in relation to exports, is currently 
dominated by Asian markets, the UK was the main trading partner from 
Federation in 1901 until it was replaced by Japan in the 1960s. China’s 
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economic emergence on the world stage in the post 2000 years was even 
more important for Australia than was Japan’s post war reconstruction 
with its subsequent effect on Australia in the 1950s and 60s. Japan in the 
post-war recovery period was also hungry for Australian resources 
particularly coal and iron ore but Japans economic slowdown saw it 
replaced by China in 2009. Table 2 below shows how Australian trade 
with china has grown between 1980 and 2012. Table 3 shows foreign 
direct investment in Australia (FDI). These figures show that Australia’s 
investment in China is upwards of $A8.3 billion and Chinese investment 
in Australia is around $A16.7 billion (DFAT Fact sheet 2013).  
   But does Australia’s trade with the three top markets in Asia actually 
translate to these “stronger, more comprehensive relationships” (p.25) as 
the White Paper suggests, and are our Asian neighbours also our closest 
allies and partners? The answer is probably not and for many Australian 
businesses the dictum is “business for the sake of business”. In other 
words, you do not have to like your trading partner in order to do 
business with them let alone develop long term relationships with them. 
   In both the United States and Australia, there has been much 
commentary about China assuming a more, assertive approach to 
international affairs and engagement with both of these countries. In the 
case of Australia, the focus has been on Chinese investment in agriculture 
and in mining, while in the US, the concern is about the power and might 
of China and its influence on the control of US government debt. The 
failed attempt by the Chinese Chinalco corporation to buy into Rio Tinto 
in 2009 and recent expressions of interest by Chinese investors to buy out 
Australian cotton producer, Cubbie Station, led to cries of “selling out the 
farm” from politicians such as Barnaby Joyce and others. Nevertheless, 
Australia has, with the exception of the telecommunications Huawei case, 
by and large avoided scare mongering against China. Indeed, the 
Huawei’s exclusion from bidding for the Australian National Broad Band 
Network (NBN), reconfirmed by the Abbott government in July 2013, 
surprised many given the special trade relationship between China and 
Australia. What makes the case even more surprising is the fact that the 
Managing Director of Huawei is a former Admiral of the Australian Navy 
and its Australian board includes reputable Australian politicians such as 
former Victorian Premier John Brumby and former Foreign Affairs 
Minister and leader of the Liberal Party of Australia, Alexander Downer. 
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Table 2. Australian Exports to Principal Markets 1980-1981 to 2012-
2013  
 
 1980-1981 
($b) 
1990-1991 
($b) 
2000-2001 
($b) 
2012-2013 
($b) 
USA 2.1 5.7 11.6 9.0 
UK 0.700 1.8 4.6 5.5 
China 0.976  2.8 10.7 78.0 
Source: DFAT (2002) 
 
Table 3. Direct Foreign Investment in Australia 
 
 
         Source: NSW Government (2011). 
 
   Consequently, “setting the context” in terms of the manner in which 
Australia has developed relationships within the region, is not as positive 
as the White Paper portrays. Granted, in the White Paper Ms Gillard 
cautions that “… predicting the future is fraught with risk, but the greater 
risk is in failing to plan for our destiny” (p. ii). If Australia's destiny is to 
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exploit the Asian region as a market for Australian goods and services, 
then this White Paper captures that spirit. But seizing the economic 
opportunities that will flow from this era will not be as simple as 
documenting Australia’s aspirations in a White Paper. An editorial in the 
Australian Financial Review aptly captured this contradiction: “Australia 
has built its economic settings on a Chinese growth model which may not 
be sustainable” (Australian Financial Review, 2013). Along with the 
growing middle classes in the Asian region is a growing level of 
confidence that is driving a global mindset among Asian citizens to a 
point where they now envisage a world beyond the region. This is evident 
in patterns of outbound tourism (Turner, 2012). At the same time Europe 
and North America are vying to improve their own opportunities by 
creating bilateral trade agreements within the Asian region. Like 
Australia, these nations seek to capitalise on the potential of this large 
emerging, economic powerhouse. Australia, therefore, is but one player in 
the region, and as is the case in contemporary business practice, when 
faced with intense competition businesses seek to develop long term 
relationships based on trust and commitment (Fullerton, 2005; O’Mahony 
et al., 2013). 
   While the Labor Government believed that Australia would benefit 
from a track record of engagement with the nations of the region, when 
describing Australia's principal relationships within Asia the White Paper 
lists China, India, Indonesia, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Within the 
same section of the White Paper, it is noted that Australia's alliance with 
the United States remains as strong as ever, highlighting some notional 
link with the US in Australia's Asian relationship. This dilutes the concept 
of a principal relationship between Australia and our Asian neighbours, 
limiting trust and the commitment required to develop lasting, meaningful 
relationships. Indeed, recent scholarly work would suggest that our 
alliance with the US is not sustainable, which has significant implications 
for our relations with China and indeed with our other Asian neighbours. 
For example, White (2013) asserts that the Australian approach towards 
the US and its related approach in Asia and especially towards China, 
underscores an Australian “… assumption … that America knows what 
it’s doing with China, and will do what’s best. This goes hand in hand 
with the assumption that Australia has no choice but to support American 
primacy in Asia against the threat of Chinese hegemony. Both these 
assumptions now need to be challenged” (White, 2013, p. 13). 
   Recent concern from China about the new Australian Abbott 
government and its “harder line” foreign policy in relation to China does 
little to improve this perception (Murray and Grigg, 2013). Leaving aside 
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the political back-patting permeating this one and a half page foreword, 
this opening statement fails to convince the reader that the White Paper is 
indeed “… focused on fairness… ”(p. iii). Most readers would consider 
this section of the document to be somewhat immodest, verging on 
arrogant, with an added hint of threat in the form of Australia's 
relationship with the US. This view would appear to be shared by Asian 
observers. Murray Hunter wrote in the Jakarta Post on 30 October 2012, 
For example: 
 
“The paper … reeks of Austro-centrism where most of 
the points made in the document are written with the 
expectation that Australia will win out with closer ties 
with Asia without necessarily giving much back in 
exchange — such as Australia having closer ties with 
Asian universities in order to attract students and skilled 
workers. Rather one–way to say the least” (Hunter, 
2012).   
 
   Hunter is sceptical of Australia’s claim to be a competitive force in the 
region explaining that first it must have an accepted place in the region. 
This belies the documents emphasis on stronger and more comprehensive 
relationships as well as vibrant cultural connections. It is even more 
worrying when, in chapter five, the relationship element is presented as 
“… enabling closer economic and social integration across the Asian 
region …” (p. 134).   
   It should be noted, however, that the White Paper has a three stage 
implementation timeline (which is presented in Chapters 5 to 9). The first 
stage, described on pages 134 and 135, is to be completed by 2013 and 
this stage is a consultation phase in which the Government seeks to 
promote and facilitate discussion through a series of State by State 
consultation fora. The second stage, which runs from 2014 to 2018, as 
described on pages 24 and 25, will concentrate on building a deeper 
understanding and relationships within the region and seeks to develop 
broader economic integration and connectivity. Stage three (presented on 
page 252) runs from 2019 to 2025 and this final stage is designed to focus 
on ensuring Australia becomes fully part of the region across all levels of 
society, business, government and the community (Burgess, 2013). Thus, 
we see some acknowledgement in this implementation regime that there 
is still some work to be done in the area of relationship development.   
   Nevertheless, the focus on an emerging wealthy and mobile middle-
class is correct and, within this context, no doubt the demand for 
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Australian goods and services will increase. The areas noted in the White 
Paper where Australia will reap the benefits of this emerging middle 
class, include health, aged care, education, household goods, tourism, 
banking and financial services, as well as high quality food products. 
Market intelligence would suggest that some of these are indeed growth 
areas, for example; the emphasis on high quality food is already showing 
signs of strong demand within the region (Monk et al., 2012). Australia’s 
role in the provision of services such as health and aged care, however, is 
not as easily understood particularly since many Asian countries are 
already capitalising on health care in the form of medical tourism and 
many Australians are abandoning the national medical system to take 
advantage of low cost elective procedures, cosmetic surgery and dentistry 
in the region (Connell, 2006).   
  
5. AUSTRALIAN EDUCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY IN THE 
ASIAN CENTURY 
   The White Paper’s ambitions for national education (first outlined on 
page 2), from early childhood to tertiary education, are acknowledged as 
forming the building blocks to access the benefits of the Asian Century. 
Recent Government reports, however, including the much publicised 
Gonski report, have concluded that our schools are failing in many of the 
basics but especially in language, literacy and numeracy (Gonski Report, 
2011). School reform is required across the entire system and that system 
is charged with the aim of placing Australia in the top five schooling 
systems in the world by 2025. At the same time many of our Asian 
neighbours (the Shanghai region of China, South Korea, Singapore and 
Hong Kong) already have a world class school system. The White Paper 
also accepts that in the Shanghai region of China, the average 15 year old 
student is performing two to three years ahead of their counterparts in 
Australia or conversely Australian 15 year olds are two to three years 
behind.   
   Moreover, much of the political discussion relative to the 41 
recommendations contained within the Gonski report has centred on the 
funding required to implement those recommendations. There is general 
agreement that the implementation of the Gonksi recommendations will 
require billions of dollars in investment. The Labor Government indicated 
its intention to claw $2.8 billion out of the higher education system to 
fund schools, thus reducing the quality of education in that sector. This 
has invoked the ire of members of the Gonski panel, who see the 
education sector as one system rather than the three component parts of 
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primary, secondary and tertiary education. Thus removing funding from 
one area to fund another undermines the overall system. While this might 
suggest that the educational aspirations in the White Paper are beyond our 
means, school performance in the area of languages is even less 
promising. Australia’s first ambassador to China, Stephen Fitzgerald has 
described Labor’s promise of providing Asian language classes for every 
school student as a delusion. More importantly, he goes on to state that 
understanding China, in particular, requires a high capacity in the Chinese 
language and scoffs at the idea in the White Paper that all school pupils 
will have access to one priority Asian language (Lane, 2013).   
   This being the case, the cultural and structural changes destined to 
occur within our school system under the White Paper are unlikely to be 
achieved. Indeed, the provision of the foundations required to attempt to 
deliver on these promises requires an enormous, long-term financial 
commitment which, when added to the cost of the proposed education 
reform agenda, will represent a staggering funding investment with little 
assurance of a return on that investment.  
   The White Paper also acknowledges that Vocational or Technical and 
Further Education (TAFE) has a major role to play in creating the 
conditions for businesses to boost productivity (see page 17). Thus, 
TAFE is an important support structure because it is here that we develop 
our trade skills base and provide workers with the training and 
development programs that positively impact on productivity. The 
vocational sector is a state government prerogative, however, and in 
Victoria, the nation’s manufacturing capital, TAFE has been stripped of 
funding leading to campus closures and the abandonment of many 
programs of study. Regional providers have been particularly hard hit. 
While gaps in provision are likely to be taken up through cut-price private 
provision, this will be at the expense of quality, particularly in the 
provision of ancillary services such as libraries and student support. 
These cuts in TAFE have been replicated across other States including 
Queensland and New South Wales. Thus, it remains to be seen whether 
any productivity gains will accrue to businesses reliant on this system for 
their training and development needs.   
   The White Paper’s aspirations for Higher Education are positive. 
However, few in that sector would be happy to read about further reform 
as they grapple to absorb the deregulation of university places for local 
students and to mitigate a major downturn in international student 
enrolments. The removal of a cap on University places has already seen 
some universities struggle to fill classrooms and others to set the entry 
criteria so low it is difficult to see how this will build the capabilities 
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described in Chapter Six of the White Paper. Having 10 Australian 
universities in the top 100 worldwide by 2025 is an aspiration that may be 
possible to achieve depending on the indices used to measure success. 
For example, the QS Times ranking is more generous than the Academic 
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) and the general view is that the 
latter is the only one that matters. With five Australian Universities 
currently in the ARWU top 100 (as of 2012), achieving the goals set out 
in the White Paper will require major research funding because top 100 
status is predominantly measured in terms of research quality. This has 
now been undermined by the announcement that an already cash poor 
system is to absorb further major cuts making it among the least funded 
higher education systems in the western world. As Iain Martin reported in 
the Australian Financial Review… “just to maintain Australia’s standing 
in the global ranking probably requires a two percent annual 
improvement in performance, something that a 2 percent funding cut and 
increasingly intrusive legislation will hardly facilitate” (Martin, 2013, 
p.55).   
   Nevertheless, given that most research funding goes to the Group of 
Eight (Go8) universities, getting more of these universities up to the top 
100 standard by 2025 would seem feasible, if significant additional 
research funding was provided. Currently a number of the five research 
hubs highlighted in the White Paper, which are funded collaborations 
with the CSIRO, are already working with Go8 universities. More 
important than how many Australian universities are ranked in the 
World’s top 100 rankings, however, are the benefits that are expected to 
accrue from this achievement. Among these are the development of 
capability within Australia, the attraction of international students from 
Asia to Australia and the development, through the five aforementioned 
research hubs, of commercial, innovative spin-off companies and 
products, particularly in the area of biotechnology.   
   Dealing firstly with the former, while boasting ten of the top 100 
universities might be seen as positive, how this is to translate into a major 
opportunity for Australia is unclear. Firstly, although achieving research 
funding and increasing research can improve international rankings; this 
does not necessarily translate into better learning and teaching within 
universities. In fact, there are many who believe that the concentration on 
research leads to lower teaching standards. As a result, the link between 
top 100 universities and building capability among graduates is spurious. 
Indeed, this is more likely to increase elitism within Australian society 
which has the potential to undermine any perceived benefits. Secondly, if 
further research funding is to be diverted to Go8 universities there will be 
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less available to the other 32 universities, with a subsequent negative 
impact on learning and teaching. These are hardly the conditions that will 
attract international students from the Asian region to Australia in great 
numbers. Thus far, attempts to reinvigorate the international student 
market, which was decimated by a combination of poor policy, an 
overreaction to the opportunistic behaviour of some Registered Training 
Organisations (RTOs) and the high Australian dollar, have failed. The 
introduction of the recommendations of the Knight Review have yielded 
little or no improvement and the competitive edge granted to the US, 
Canada and New Zealand in the interim have reduced Australia’s market 
share. Of more concern is that once these alternative options become 
established, just like trade routes of the past, it is difficult to change 
behaviour. At the same time, major increases in the cost of living, for 
example - such as increases in electricity prices - means that those 
receiving scholarships in their home currencies (as do many Thai, 
Malaysian and Indonesian students) find it difficult to survive and this 
undermines many of the predicted benefits of Australia's close position to 
Asia.  
   At the same time, universities within Asia are developing their own 
capability, with major investments across the region. Malaysia has 
upgraded many of its institutions to university status, as has Indonesia. 
There has been a move to send university academics from these countries 
overseas to achieve doctoral qualifications to support these upgrades but 
we are now seeing more universities in the region supporting their 
cohorts of higher education teachers and researchers by bringing in 
eminent professorial staff to mentor and guide them within their own 
institutions. This means that scholarship funding to study overseas will 
decrease and students will be encouraged to study in their own countries.    
Moreover, changes to curriculum in Europe under the Bologna agreement 
have not gone unnoticed in the Asian region. ASEAN, for example; 
which includes Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia are shaping 
up to be a powerful, integrated union within South East Asia. This has the 
potential to negatively impact Australia’s ambitions in education and in 
tourism. For example, ASEAN is currently developing a common core 
within the higher educational curriculum so that transferability within 
ASEAN nations can be seamlessly achieved. This means that students 
can add travel and an international dimension to their studies in much the 
same way that the Bologna agreement operates within Europe. These 
developments do not validate the White Paper’s suggestion that 
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universities in Australia would be a major beneficiary of increasing 
wealth in Asia.   
   The White Paper predicts growth in a number of areas where Australia 
has export opportunities - such as agriculture, finance, mining and other 
services. While it is most likely that many of these, mainly private sector, 
businesses, will gain significant returns on shareholder investment, the 
same may not be the case for Australian taxpayers. In the following 
sections two important areas that are predicted in the White Paper to yield 
significant returns to Australia are examined. These are biotechnology 
and tourism. Australia’s ambitions in biotechnology (first mentioned on 
page 124 of the White Paper) may also be difficult to achieve. The 
biotechnology industry grew out of university-based research and was 
supported by large companies. The industry therefore relies on strong 
functioning networks to flourish. A comprehensive study into the 
biotechnology industry in Australia, however, found that the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ along with a dependence on external support for ideas, start-up 
money and taking products to market was a major barrier to this industry 
(Gilding, 2008). The study further found that there are few countries 
where distance is more of an issue, that relationships with universities 
were limited and that the key players in the industry were located 
offshore. As a result, the benefits from biotechnology to Australia, if 
indeed these were to be realised, are more likely to accrue to large, 
overseas-based companies. As a CEO interviewed for the study put it, if 
anybody “… thinks he is going to take Australian technology, and 
develop it in Australia using Australian researchers, never moving 
outside the country, […] is a fool …” (Gilding, 2008, p.1143). With a key 
biotechnology hub already established in Singapore, the aims of the 
White Paper in the development of this industry are unlikely to be 
attained.    
   As noted on pages 40 and 97 of the White Paper, tourism is another key 
service industry that is expected to underpin Australia’s economy within 
the Asian century. However, this industry also suffers from the tyranny of 
distance in that international tourist arrivals are invariably “long- haul 
tourists” (an industry term that denotes distance travelled). The 
Australian tourism industry has experienced peaks and troughs in demand 
along with crises, shocks, pandemics and natural disasters. Although a 
vulnerable industry, it is expected to grow (Rifai, 2011; Yeoman, 2008) 
particularly in the Asian Pacific region where a 6.5 percent annual 
increase is predicted to 2020 (WTO, 2001). Within the White Paper, 
capturing the Asian market appears to be based mainly on advertising 
tourism, which is an expensive strategy particularly when Tourism 
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Australia, which manages these campaigns, has been criticised in the past 
for missing the mark with its advertising. The Lara Bingle, “where the 
bloody hell are you?” campaign is one example. Curiously, Tourism 
Australia’s more recent promotions have included heavy investment in 
the Australian movie industry as well as attracting Oprah Winfrey and 
Ellen DeGeneres to host their shows in Australia. These initiatives 
provide significant television exposure for Australia. Nonetheless, the 
audience is mainly American and Australia does not host American 
tourists in large numbers. At the same time, future tourist arrivals from 
Europe are forecasted to either decrease or weakly increase in the next 
few years and current forecasts would suggest that tourism to Australia 
from most Asian countries is likely to decline from 2014 (Turner, 2012).  
   Table 4 shows the forecasted outbound tourism Average Annual 
Growth Rate from a number of Asian countries to 2014. As well as where 
they are expected to go. The table shows America will gain most from 
Asian outbound tourism with Australia (which is grouped within the 
Pacific region) reliant mainly on Chinese travellers. Within what is 
shaping up to be a competitive market, it is difficult to see the link 
between the Chinese traveller and American TV shows as suggesting that 
a more focussed strategy will be required to reap the benefits of the Asian 
Century for Australian tourism. Moreover, given that Australia’s tourism 
eggs are firmly in one basket then, the relationship with China is crucial 
to its success.   
 
Table 4. A Comparison of Average Annual Growth Rate (AAGR) 
Percentage of Outgoing Travellers from East Asia and India 
 
 Americas  Asia  Pacific 
Chinese travellers 16.04 12.62 11.27 
Taiwanese Travellers 0.67 1.85 0.26 
Hong Kongese Travellers 3.25 1.49 1.99 
Japanese Travellers  0.39 3.34 -8.07 
Korean Travellers 4.17 6.32 -3.09 
Indian Travellers 3.39 9.43 3.64 
       Source: Turner (2012). 
 
 
556                                 Mascitelli and O’Mahony 
 
6. WHAT THE WHITE PAPER SAYS AND WHAT IT DOES NOT 
   With over 350 pages of carefully crafted phrases the document brings 
together Australia’s current economic reality with China and presents this 
with an excess of fanciful spin and expectations for the future. The 
document acknowledges the pace of GDP growth across China, India, 
Korea and other Asian countries, omitting Japan, no doubt due to its 
struggling economy and disappointing economic predictions over the 
coming years. The White Paper has made the assumption that economic 
growth rates can continue into 2025 based on the last ten years of growth. 
Many observers are less confident that both China and India can sustain 
these high growth rates. Some of the processes that drove the economic 
growth of these economies are no longer present and the global economic 
crisis that erupted in 2008 continues to rock Europe, the United States 
and Japan, Asia’s principal markets. This is taking its toll on global 
growth rates and especially growth rates in key Asian markets. World 
Bank data and forecasts for 2012 indicate that the Asian economies 
excluding Japan and India will be 7.2 percent, down from 8.3 percent in 
2011. China is expected to grow by just 7.7 percent, compared to 9.3 
percent last year. Indian growth will be about 6 percent, down from more 
than 8 percent.  
   Australia is seen as fortunate to be in the vicinity of these economic 
powerhouses which, for now, continue to access Australian resources. As 
a result, Australia finds itself in a privileged position, but it would be fair 
to say that this is not based on carefully crafted relationships rather it is 
another manifestation of Australia’s status as “the Lucky Country”.  
   Demand for minerals has driven the Australian economy and allowed 
Australia to survive the global financial crisis, thus far, without recession. 
While mining continues to comprise about two thirds of Australia’s 
exports to Asia, and even more so to China, there are some bumps on the 
horizon, which according to Rowan Callick in the The Australian, the 
Labor Government had chosen to overlook. The mining boom in its iron 
ore centrality is no longer reliable and, according to some pundits, is 
slowly declining. Callick asserts that:  
 
“… the Labor government ignored warnings of China’s 
economic slowdown and that recent economic data on 
China’s economy has been overlooked because Canberra 
has placed China firmly in the frame for our economic 
woes, its slowing is portrayed as an utterly expected 
event” (Callick, 2013, p.24).  
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   But the White Paper argues that once this boom has passed, Australia 
must become more competitive selling other goods and services to 
affluent Asia, such as food, education, health and financial services. 
Clearly the author of the White Paper, Ken Henry, wants Australia to 
jettison the “dismal thinking of the past” and also the tyranny of distance 
from its old partners in Europe and America, and to “embrace its 
geography” creating major markets for Australian goods closer to home. 
   In Australia, much commentary and criticism has been levelled at the 
shortcomings of the White Paper mainly based on a lack of commitment 
to providing the financial resources to fund the initiatives presented 
within the document. Former Victorian Premier Ted Ballieu directly 
attacked the Labor government for “… inconsistency in its statements of 
support for greater engagement with Asia but then cutting the budget for 
trade officials and export grants” (Dunckley and Earl 2012, p. 6) and for 
reneging on a commitment to opening Embassies and Consulates 
throughout Asian countries. The recent cuts to higher education are 
another example, of a schizophrenic, naive view that improvements can 
be made without funding. Another damning criticism is the extent to 
which narrower Labor government policies permeate the White Paper 
departing from the bipartisan approach of past White Papers. While the 
White Paper has reaffirmed the US at the centre of the regions security 
axis, at the same time it dismisses the key economic roles which both the 
US and the European economies play in maintaining a strong Australian 
economy. Little mention is made of the key role which American and 
British investment play in growing the Australian economy.  
   The White Paper, therefore, which was intended to be a visionary 
statement, seems to contain little of that. It sees Australia’s economic 
advantage yet again as a minerals in the ground seller, a product of luck 
and fortune blowing in the winds of fate rather than a country endowed 
with any particular leadership, vision or talent to navigate the Asian 
Century. The report positions Australia as an outsider in a distant 
relationship with Asia bereft of trust or commitment. The framework 
presented is built around exploiting its mineral wealth as a seller in good 
times as the Asian tiger economies continue to grow rapidly. What the 
document fails to tackle is the strong possibility that the world will not 
remain positioned in a manner to benefit Australia. During the 1970s and 
1980s Japan was a significant player in Australian economic life but 
withdrew in the 1990s due to the collapse of the Japanese economy. 
There is little reason to think that China could not respond in the same 
way. The report also fails to acknowledge competition from other 
western countries particularly the US and Europe who are also vying for 
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Asian business, creating trade agreements, trading blocs and no doubt 
developing their own White Papers to support them. Equally, if not more 
worrying, is recent speculation about economic decline among Asian 
economies. UBS senior economic advisor George Magnus has publicly 
posited the question “Is the Asia miracle over?” In his view “slightly 
slower growth and relatively disappointing equity returns over the last 18 
months should be of fleeting concern” (Asia Today International 2012, p. 
8). Although the Japanese economy currently appears to be returning to 
growth, being dependent upon more monetary easing may mean that this 
growth is not sustained. Australia can benefit from economic 
improvements in Japan. Indeed, Japanese investment in Australia has 
gradually increased over the last two decades into a diverse portfolio that 
includes Toyota, Paper Australia (in 2009), and Dairy Farmers (Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, defence and Trade, 2013). This 
suggests that two-way trade relationships, such as that which is 
foreshadowed in the Australia/Japan free trade agreement currently under 
negotiation, are likely to be more enduring than the one way trade flows 
suggested in the White Paper.  
 
7. HAUNTED BY PAST LEGACIES 
   The overly optimistic view of the White Paper has also been criticised 
in a comment entitled “Dark side of white paper”, by Australian 
Financial Review commentator Geoffrey Barker, who noted that: “The 
white paper sees but does not stress the dark side of international 
relations. Security is hardly mentioned until the eighth chapter and the 
tone stays determinedly optimistic.” Barker lists the potential triggers for 
conflict including a clash between the US and China, noting that “neither 
trade and financial integration, nor economic independence” prevented 
the outbreak of the First World War.  
   The best judge of how Australia is viewed in the region comes from the 
region. Building on his comments noted earlier, Hunter’s observations 
from Indonesia take on a sarcastic note:  
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“After decades of successive government foreign 
and trade policy, Australia still does not have any 
embedded position within the region. The influence 
of Australian business and financial institutions in 
the region is minor, nowhere near the critical mass 
needed to become a competitive force in the region. 
The only exception is in the mining sector, which 
to all intents and purposes has made the Australian 
economy very dependent upon demand in Asia, 
particularly China” (Hunter, 2012).  
 
   For at least 40 years policymakers here have grappled with the 
chapter’s groundwork on how to focus Australia more closely on Asia. 
Over that time, Europe’s dominant place in immigration has waned. 
Seven Asian countries figured among Australia’s top ten sources of 
migration in 2011-12. India and China occupied first and second place 
respectively and mandarin has replaced Italian and Greek as the most 
commonly spoken languages in Australia after English. Cultural hurdles 
linger in the path of the white paper’s aspirations for closer Asian 
integration. A survey by Certified Practicing Accountants (CPA) 
Australia, an accounting body, found that Australian businesses (except 
mining and farming) typically rate Asian markets less important than 
domestic ones. Australia, it says, risks being a spectator rather than a 
player in the Asian Century.   
   In the 1990s, Prime Minister Paul Keating stated that Australia was part 
of Asia and made a concerted effort to embed Australia within the region. 
However many of these gains have been perceived to have been lost 
when John Howard came to power in 1996, reaffirming the Canberra-
Washington link and in so doing, earning the label for Australia as the 
US’s deputy sheriff in Asia. Australia’s relationship within the region, as 
presented in the White Paper, is one where Australia needs the region 
more than the region needs Australia. The Australian market is small 
compared to other markets and of little interest to regional exporters who 
prefer to put their efforts into the larger markets like China, Japan, the 
European Union and the US. White Papers aside, therefore, it is action 
and not words that will be important in realising the White Paper agenda 
and China and the region will be surprised to see any real change in 
Australia’s outlook, despite the emphasis in Chapter Nine of the White 
Paper on relationship development, “closer people to people links” and 
“vibrant cultural connections”.     
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   One of the paramount barriers that must be overcome is the deep set 
belief that Australia’s cultural values are not necessarily universally 
accepted across the region. In other words, it’s not simply about learning 
Asian languages but about understanding different points of view, 
approaches, and “mindsets”. Austro-centrism must, therefore, take a back 
seat in relationships around the region for Australia to be seriously 
considered a member of the region.   
   In this respect, the White Paper is still haunted by Australia’s past. 
Maybe it’s time for Australia to climb out from under the US security 
blanket and become a mature and independent nation within the Asian 
region. However, one fears that the emphasis on the promise of a rise in 
real income from the “Asian Century” initiative, suggests the document 
has been developed to pander to the domestic electorate. More worrying 
is the fact that, within the White Paper, Asia is seen only as a means for 
income levels in Australia to become among the top 10 per-capita 
incomes in the world. Under these circumstances therefore, the White 
Paper is positioned as a promissory note to be cashed in for a better future 
within Australia at some later stage in the Asian Century, this based upon 
the misconception that internal capacity building will make Australia 
more competitive in Asia. Thus the opportunity to “come of age” and 
develop a real strategy to engage within the region would appear to have 
been lost, a position that is confirmed by The Economist as follows:  
 
Ms Gillard steered clear of the white paper’s views on a 
key issue occupying foreign-policy: how Australia 
should manage any conflict between America, its closest 
strategic ally, and China, its biggest trading partner. 
Australia, the paper says, welcomes China’s rise and 
accepts that its military growth is a “natural, legitimate 
outcome of its growing economy and broadening 
interests”; any cold-war-type containment of China 
would not work. A recent poll by the Lowy Institute, a 
think-tank, found a majority of Australians do not see 
China as a likely military threat (The Economist, 2012).  
 
8. SECURITY CONCERNS 
   The White Paper devotes a chapter to strategic considerations, noting in 
particular that Australia “will work with the United States to ensure it 
continues to have a strong and consistent presence in the region.” It 
points out that the economic emergence of China and India has the 
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potential to generate tensions and rivalries and that the many regional 
flashpoints create “the danger of miscalculation and accident”. But it 
dismisses the danger of war, by declaring that “Beijing and Washington 
both want to develop constructive relations and avoid conflict: their 
governments have consistently said so.”  
   The document reaffirms Australia’s loyalty to the United States and 
hints at the historic role of the US as Australia’s saviour. There has been a 
total commitment from successive Australian governments through the 
Cold War until the present time to US foreign policy as a result of US 
military aid in World War II. This has come at the loss of Australia’s 
individual identity in Southeast Asia. In contrast, China is now so 
important to Australian trade, investment, and tourism that Australia 
could be in danger of being ignored by China as a result of its staunch 
loyalty to the US. Since Prime Minister Gillard’s 2013 visit to China, 
however, there has been a change in Government rhetoric, which Kerin 
reports “as part of its softer line on China…”. Kerin believes that there is 
a move away from the government’s defence strategy, articulated in the 
white paper and that the Government is expected “… to assert that 
Australia does not have to choose between its security guarantor, the 
United States and its biggest trading partner China” (Kerin, 2013, p. 5).  
   No doubt China would prefer to deal with an Australia with a mature 
and independent foreign policy rather than an enthusiastic promoter of 
US foreign policy. In essence, Australia needs to decide whether the ties 
that bind will be geographic and based on developing unconditional 
relationships or hark back to yesteryear. Perhaps Australia can learn from 
the Indonesian approach of dynamic equilibrium, a doctrine where 
Washington and Beijing would agree to co-exist rather than compete for 
supremacy in the Asian region. These issues were extremely sensitive for 
the Gillard government, a point that was underscored in the Australian 
which reported that the Labour Government took the extraordinary step 
of ordering a major, last-minute rewrite of the White Paper by Allan 
Gyngell, from the Office of National Assessments. This key intelligence 
agency was apparently consulted because of concerns about the original 
draft, because it had “initially overlooked the continuing role of the US in 
the region”. Gyngell, it was reported, was called in to assist in making the 
document palatable to Washington. The omission was not accidental. By 
emphasising the economic imperatives confronting Australian capitalism, 
the White Paper necessarily focussed on its most dynamic economic 
partnerships, which lie in Asia, above all in China, and not with the 
United States (although it is acknowledged that the US is still our biggest 
source of FDI). Yet it would appear that Australian-Asian relations are, to 
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some degree, threatened by Washington’s drive to maintain a dominant 
position in the region at the direct expense of China (Fullilove and Oliver, 
2013). Some among Australia’s business elite appear to agree with this 
view and are cynical of the government’s espoused priorities in relation to 
trade and the development of relationships in the region. As a result, they 
have determined to develop their own alliances especially with China. 
Casino mogul James Packer for example recently lambasted Australian 
policy makers for continuing to define China through the eyes of the cold 
war (Kitney, 2012). His view was supported by other Australian business 
personalities such as Kerry Stokes, whose main concern was the harsh 
opposition towards certain Chinese investment proposals in Australia and 
antagonism from certain conservative politicians such as Barnaby Joyce, 
suggesting a lack of trust in Australian-Asian relationships.    
   Far from being a roadmap to a century of peace and prosperity, 
therefore, the document’s glaring omissions underline the precarious 
position of Australian capitalism as it attempts to straddle the growing 
strategic antagonism between the US and China, while at the same time 
struggling to keep economically buoyant as Europe and the US slowly 
recovery from the global economic crisis. Insofar as the White Paper 
outlines a strategy, it is to assist Australian businesses to become ever-
more “internationally competitive”.   
  
9. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
   Our conclusion centres on whether “Australia will be a more prosperous 
and resilient nation, fully part of the region and open to the world” 
(Gillard p. 5). Given the polarity between Australia’s history within the 
region and that which is portrayed within the White Paper, one could be 
tempted to conclude that Australia is schizophrenic. Certainly history 
would suggest that, on many occasions, Australia has perceived its 
location as a geographical constraint and that there is another place where 
it would rather be. Australia has, for the most part, perceived itself to be a 
western nation, with western values captured within an Asian perimeter 
and relationships have neither been longstanding nor friendly. It is also 
important to remember that Australia has only recently disengaged from 
the cold war framework of Asia and embraced an economic opportunities 
approach to relationship development within the region. However, as a 
new-world country Australia has made its mark on the global scene in a 
relatively short time and is now commanding global attention for its 
economic prosperity in trying financial times. This critique suggests that 
there is still much work to be done in relationship development and to 
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progress Australia’s’ standing in the region so that future engagement is 
based on trust and friendship rather than purely economic imperatives.   
   It is important to acknowledge that Australia punches above its weight 
in terms of living standards, equity and social inclusion and these are the 
values that make a difference. Thus, Australia in the Asian Century must 
emerge as a regional leader using its position to bring nations together, 
share in regional success and promote the very values that have placed 
this nation in this unique and enviable position. The White Paper fails to 
deliver on this potential, overstating capability and capacity, particularly 
in the areas of skills, education, innovation and relationship development 
and presents a number of unrealistic expectations with little or no 
apparent intention to fund the fundamental initiatives required to deliver 
on the promises contained in the document.   
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